

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03

NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 ICA-11 /160 W

-----111717 291157Z /10

R 291056Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1204

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 09417

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, UR, UN, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET-US DISCUSSIONS OF SSOD: DISARMAMENT  
MACHINERY

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR LEONARD AND ACDA COUNSELOR YARMOLIN-  
SKY MET WITH SOVIET DELEGATION LED BY ISSRAELYAN AT MFA  
ON APRIL 28. ON DISARMAMENT MACHINERY ISSRAELYAN WAS  
ANXIOUS THAT THE U.S. AND THE USSR SHOW A HIGH DEGREE OF  
SOLDARITY IN RESISTING CONCESSIONS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE  
AT THE SSOD ON ANY CHANGES IN THE CCD. LEONARD POINTED  
OUT THAT SOME CNANGES WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A  
HEALTHY ATTITUDE TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND MULTILATERAL  
DISARMAMENT EFFORTS. ISSRAELYAN INDICATED THAT AT END  
OF SSOD THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY BE READY TO CONCEDE  
COCHAIRMANSHIP AND AGREE TO LIMITED CCD ENLARGEMENT.  
SOVIETS REMAIN OPPOSED TO ESTABLISHMENT OF CLOSER UN-  
CCD LINKS. ISSRAELYAN PROPOSED THAT WE CONSIDER THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT U.S.-SOVIET WORKING GROUP  
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AT THE CCD IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SPECIAL U.S.-SOVIET ROLE  
IF THE COCHAIRMANSHIP IS TO BE GIVEN UP. END SUMMARY.

1. ON DISARMAMENT MACHINERY SECTION OF SSOD DRAFT  
DOCUMENT, LEONARD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY STATING THAT  
THE U.S. HOPES TO KEEP CHANGES IN THE CCD TO AN ABSOLUTE  
MINIMUM AND TO MAINTAIN CCD INTEGRITY AS A NEGOTIATING

FORUM, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE PRESERVATION OF CONSENSUS. PRESSURES FROM A NUMBER OF STATES INCLUDING FRANCE AND INDIA INDICATE THAT SOME CHANGES HAVE TO BE MADE. ISSRAELYAN STATED THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS SEEMED VERY CLOSE BUT HE SOUGHT TO LEARN WHAT CHANGES THE U.S. MIGHT ACCEPT AND COMPLAINED THAT THE U.S. SEEMS WILLING TO LET THE SOVIET UNION LEAD THE FIGHT AGAINST THE NONALIGNED POSITION.

2. LEONARD THEN OUTLINED US VIEWS ON THE CCD IN SOME DETAIL INCLUDING NEED TO MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, TO OPERATE BY CONSENSUS, TO DETERMINE AGENDA AND ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE AND TO HAVE A LIMITED MEMBERSHIP. CONSIDERATION OUGHT TO BE GIVEN, HOWEVER, TO ACCEPTING SOME CHANGES WHICH COULD IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE BY INDICATING RESPONSIVENESS TO THE CONCERNS OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND OTHERS FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT AND FOR A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNGA. COSMETIC CHANGES, SUCH AS CHANGING THE NAME, COULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED PROVIDED THE BASIC INTEGRITY OF THE NEGOTIATING BODY WAS MAINTAINED. ANY CHANGES OUGHT TO BE MADE BY THE CCD ITSELF, PERHAPS AT ITS SUMMER SESSION. THE SSOD COULD MERELY INDICATE THE GENERAL NATURE OF THESE CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS. AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES, LEONARD MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF ALLOWING NON-MEMBERS TO PRESENT PAPERS  
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AND MAKE STATEMENTS ON SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST AND POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING PUBLIC OR CLOSED MEETINGS DEPENDING ON NATURE OF SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.

3. ISSRAELYAN INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH CONCEPT OF LIMITED CHANGE TO BE CONTROLLED AND DETERMINED BY CCD ITSELF. HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONSENSUS, NOT BEING SUBORDINATED TO THE UN, AN KEEPING MEMBERSHIP LIMITED.

4. ON QUESTION OF THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP, LEONARD INDICATED OUR PREPAREDNESS TO GIVE IT UP IF THIS WOULD HELP TO PRESERVE INTEGRITY OF THE NEGOTIATING FORUM. YARMOLINSKY REVIEWED OUR THINKING ON POSSIBLE UPGRADING OF SYG'S REPRESENTATIVE TO BE THE CHAIRMAN OR APPOINTMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT FOR A FIXED TERM. LEONARD SUGGESTED THE CHAIR COULD ALSO CONTINUE TO ROTATE AMONG ALL MEMBERS ON A DAILY BASIS AS IS PRESENTLY DONE.

5. ISSRAELYAN, AFTER INDICATING STRONG PREFERENCE FOR RETENTION OF CO-CHAIRMANSHIP (AN OBLIGATION AND A RESPONSIBILITY, HE SAID), FINALLY INDICATED THAT SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO GIVE IT UP IF WE WERE READY TO DO SO,

BUT URGED STRONGLY THAT WE DO SO ONLY AT VERY END OF THE SPECIAL SESSION. HE EMPHASIZED NEED TO REMAIN FIRM AND NOT MAKE THIS OR OTHER CONCESSIONS EARLY ON, SINCE ON MACHINERY ISSUES BOTH SIDES WERE IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND HAD NOTHING TO GAIN. HE WAS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT UPGRADING ROLE OF THE SYG'S REPRESENTATIVE. VAVILOV INDICATED THAT THIS COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO CLOSER UN/CCD RELATIONSHIP THAN WAS DESIRABLE.

6. IF CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IS INDEED GIVEN UP, ISSRAELYAN URGED CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ALTERNATIVE LEGAL FORMS TO PROTECT THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE US AND USSR IN DIS-

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ARMAMENT. HE SUGGESTED ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE CCD OF A PERMANENT US/USSR WORKING GROUP. TIMERBAEV EXPLAINED THAT OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAINTAIN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH US AND USSR COULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT BILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT HAVING TO BRING IN OTHER CCD MEMBERS.

7. REGARDING POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF CCD MEMBERSHIP, ISSRAELYAN SAID HE PREFERRED TO MAINTAIN PRESENT MEMBERSHIP BUT COULD ENVISAGE AGREEING TO VERY LIMITED INCREASE. WHEN PRESSED, HE SAID THIS COULD INVOLVE ADDITION OF 3-4 NEW MEMBERS. IN ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY NON-MEMBERS INTERESTED IN MEMBERSHIP, ALGERIA, AUSTRALIA AND NORWAY WERE MENTIONED. AMONG NEUTRALS, AUSTRIA AND FINLAND

ARE ALSO INTERESTED. ISSRAELYAN ALSO EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING CHINA IN SINCE, IF CONSENSUS PRINCIPLE OPERATES, THIS COULD LEAD TO "PARALYSIS" OF CCD WORK. LEONARD DOUBTED CHINA IS GOING TO JOIN NOW IN ANY CASE BUT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO HOLD OPEN POSSIBILITY OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN LONGER TERM.  
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8. ON THE NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL TO RECONVENE THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, ISSRAELYAN INDICATED THAT HE WAS UNENTHUSIASTIC AND SAW LITTLE VALUE IN THIS PROPOSAL. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE AND THAT HE COULD ENVISAGE A CONCESSION ON THIS POINT LATE IN THE SSOD IN EXCHANGE FOR NON-ALIGNED AGREEMENT O MINIMAL CHANGES IN THE CCD. SOVIETS INDICATED READINESS TO AGREE THAT FIRST COMMITTEE WOULD FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. THEY REMAIN RESERVED ON POSSIBLE STRENGTHENING OF THE UN CENTER FOR DISARMAMENT.

9. IN BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE FRENCH PROPOSALS, ISSRAELYAN REPORTED THAT IMPRESSION OF SOVIET DEL AT PREPCOM V WAS THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT FOR FRENCH PROPOSAL TO REPLACE THE CCD WITH A NEW NEGOTIATING BODY. THE USSR, HE SAID, WANTS THE FRENCH TO PARTICIPATE IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA BUT ONLY AT A REASONABLE PRICE. IN PARTICULAR, SOVIETS REMAIN OPPOSED TO IDEA THAT CCD WOULD BE SUBORDINATE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. LEONARD SUGGESTED THAT "NEW" BODY MIGHT BE NEW IN NAME ONLY, AND THAT FRENCH MIGHT BE PERSUADED THAT CLOSER LINK TO UN NEED NOT INVOLVE SUBORDINATION. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE FRENCH VIEWS IN PARIS ON MAY 2, AND WOULD STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIETS. IT WAS UNCLEAR TO US WHY FRENCH WANTED SUCH A CLOSE CCD/UN LINK AND IT SEEMED THEY THEMSELVES DID NOT UNDERSTAND ISSUE CLEARLY. OTHER FRENCH PROPOSALS --E.G., TO CHANGE THE NAME AND SOMEWHAT INCREASE THE MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US PROVIDED THE ESSENCE OF THE CCD AS AN EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT NEGOTIATING BODY OF LIMITED SIZE COULD BE MAINTAINED. TOON

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## Message Attributes

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